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ABSTRACT <all caps & bold, but just 11 pt text> 
<blank line between titles and text> 
Fire safety regulation is changing as adherence to prescriptive requirements is being replaced or 
complemented by an approach based on performance based design (PBD). However, this shift in 
regulatory practice raises important issues concerning the ability of regulators to provide competent 
oversight of fire safety engineering. This stems from the inevitable ‘expertise asymmetry’ that exists 
between regulators and those who are regulated, and means that regulators must rely on, and trust, data 
and analysis that is produced by industry. This dilemma could logically be resolved if fire safety 
engineering was accorded the status of a self-regulating profession whose competence and ethics were 
trusted by regulators. However, there are two main barriers to this: doubts about whether fire safety 
engineering is yet sufficiently mature as a profession; and concerns about whether the probabilistic 
nature of fire risks make fire safety engineering unsuitable for self-regulation. 
<leave two blank lines after each section> 
<…> 
INTRODUCTION 
<…> 
Regulation has long been a feature of fire safety engineering, and one that is widely acknowledged to 
have greatly reduced fire casualties during the twentieth century. Initially implementation of this 
regulation was driven by major fires with common-sense interpretation of the factors involved leading 
to prescriptive requirements for new buildings. For example, following the Great Fire of London of 
1666 regulations were introduced affecting the width of roads, the use of materials (brick or stone, not 
wood), the width of party walls, etc. [1] This type of prescriptive regulation was augmented during the 
mid twentieth century by knowledge gained from standard testing, particularly as regards the fire 
resistance of materials and building elements. The main US standard furnace test, ASTM (American 
Society for Testing and Materials) E119, introduced in 1918, and the similar British Standard 476 test 
standards first promulgated in 1932, specify time-temperature curves according to which structural 
elements such as beams and columns are exposed under defined conditions in a furnace. [2] These 
standardised tests provided a mechanism by which crude measures of fire resistance, such as party 
walls needing to be two bricks thick (as set out in the regulations that resulted from the Great Fire of 
London), could be quantified into more comparable measures such as, say, 60 minutes fire resistance. 
Prescriptive regulation thus became underpinned by exhaustive schedules listing the required fire 
resistance of building elements. [3] 
 
It was always recognised that such standard testing provided comparability rather than an accurate 
representation of real fires, and post-war research (for example, at the Fire Research Station in the 
UK) sought better understanding of the fundamentals of fire and smoke phenomena and of the 
structural responses of buildings. This better understanding made it possible to argue that fire safety 
knowledge was sufficiently advanced for bespoke engineering solutions to present a viable alternative 
to prescriptive regulation. Moreover, practical application of this knowledge in modelling tools 
became attractive with the greater computer power that became readily available in the late twentieth 
century. Rather than any particular type of building being required to incorporate the prescriptive 
‘one-size-fits-all’ fire safety features, buildings could then have fire safety solutions designed 
individually through a Performance Based Design (PBD) approach. [4] Such PBD fire safety 
engineering was seen as desirable because it could enable the use of innovative building designs and 
materials, allow the use of constrained or usually shaped sites that would otherwise be inhibited if 
strict compliance with prescriptive rules was required, enable fire risks to be addressed rationally, and 
in some cases be less costly than prescriptive solutions that for many buildings include large margins 
of safety. 
 
However, this shift to PBD fire engineering has raised concerns about the regulation of fire safety 
solutions. In a PBD approach, who decides (and on what basis) what constitutes a sufficient level of 
fire safety? [5] Does the use of PBD mean that acceptable levels of safety become a matter for 
engineers’ design choices rather than being societally mandated in regulatory requirements? [6] More 
specifically, if fire safety solutions are implemented and justified through the use of state-of-the-art 
knowledge and modelling tools, can regulators have sufficient expertise to understand what they are 
being asked to approve?  
 
This paper addresses these concerns through comparison with regulatory practices in other industries 
(aviation and pharmaceuticals). The key challenge for regulation of complex technologies lies in the 
‘expertise asymmetry’ between regulators and those that are regulated. Unless regulators are heavily 
funded to enable them to maintain high levels of technical competence this expertise asymmetry 
inevitably means that regulators must rely on data and analysis provided by those they are regulating. 
This means in practice that many industries in effect self-regulate to some extent, and raises the 
question of whether such a practice should be formalised for fire safety. One mechanism for doing this 
would be through the acceptance by regulators that professional accreditation of fire engineers 
provides sufficient assurance of effective fire safety solutions, and the potential for such an approach 
is considered through a comparison with regulation of structural engineering. 
 
REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY 
<…> 
Advances in technology can produce many benefits, but typically there are negative consequences too, 
and the classic societal response has been to attempt to maximise the benefits while mitigating any 
harmful consequences through regulation. Regulatory effectiveness depends on there being sufficient 
understanding of how these impacts occur and how regulations would ameliorate harmful 
consequences while sustaining technology’s benefits. Regulators thus need to know about the 
performance of technology. To what extent does a drug cause side-effects relative to its benefits? [7] 
Are planes safe enough to carry passengers? [8] Do genetically modified crops risk contamination of 
natural species? [9] Or, are building sufficiently safe as regards fire risks? 
 
However, the extent to which regulators need to understand the performance of technology varies 
according to the type of regulation. Three approaches are typically used, with regulation focused on: 
(1) achieving certain measurable outcomes (e.g. a level of pollution in industrial effluent); (2) policing 
the use of prescribed techniques (e.g. the use of ‘best available technology’ for a particular industrial 
process); or (3) being able to assess prospective performance as satisfactory (e.g. will an aircraft 
design be reliable enough that each safety critical system will suffer no more than one failure in every 
billion hours of flight). The first of these regulatory approaches measures actual outcomes 
retrospectively and does not require the regulator to have in-depth knowledge of the processes being 
regulated. However, such an approach requires some tolerance of unsatisfactory outcomes. Whereas it 
may provide a suitable approach for regulation of effluent from paper mills or breweries (most of 
whose discharges are only harmful to ecosystems in excessive concentrations), such an approach has 
not been seen as suitable for the regulation of airliner reliability, drug safety, or indeed fire safety. 
Although individuals or organisations that are held responsible for fire casualties or damage can be 
prosecuted, fire safety regulation has not been predicated on retrospective measurement of fire 
outcomes. 
 
Instead fire safety regulation has traditionally sought to attain satisfactory outcomes through 
prescriptive regulation that requires the use of specific approaches for any given type of building. 
Prescriptive fire safety regulations thus specify required building characteristics such as the fire 
resistance of structures (as rated in furnace tests), enclosed stairways of particular sizes, maximum 
travel distances to stairs, whether sprinklers should be used, and so on. Effective though these 
prescriptive regulations appear to have been, they have come to be seen as increasingly onerous and 
often irrational. In particular, because the prescriptive approach specifies particular solutions it can 
limit innovation in architectural design and use of new materials, and present insuperable barriers to 
developments in constrained sites. For example, Norman Foster’s innovative design of Stansted airport 
envisaged a large, high-ceilinged space that would not have been allowed by the traditional 
prescriptive approach, instead requiring first principles fire safety engineering to convince regulators 
that the building was safe (see below). 
 
In recent decades this prescriptive approach to fire safety regulation has been supplanted or 
complemented by a regulatory approach based on assessment of prospective performance in what is 
widely known as Performance Based Design (PBD). The introduction of PBD as a regulatory option 
addresses the dissatisfaction with the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of prescriptive regulation, and has 
been made possible by the belief that fundamental fire safety knowledge has progressed sufficiently to 
enable bespoke fire engineering solutions to be designed and assessed. 
 
An important advantage of regulation focussed on prospective performance is that it facilitates 
innovation. Rather than strict prescriptive rules that have to be followed, the regulatory requirements 
are expressed in terms of overall performance. For example, in aviation regulation the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) makes it clear that its regulatory approach seeks to ensure aircraft 
reliability without specifying particular technological approaches: ‘As much as possible, regulations 
do not constrain designers a priori by specifying details such as material properties or the design of 
individual structures. Instead, designers are given a free hand to incorporate new materials, structural 
concepts, etc., so long as they accept the responsibility for showing that systems with innovative 
design features meet the FAA’s stringent reliability requirements.’ [10] 
 
However, the challenge of this type of regulation is for the regulator to have sufficient competence to 
understand the proposed approaches sufficiently well to provide the desired oversight. While 
technologies are generally getting more complex, and reliant on more specialised knowledge, there is a 
contrasting reduction in the willingness of many governments to pay for regulatory oversight. There is 
thus an ‘expertise asymmetry’ in which regulators will inevitably have less understanding of the 
technology than those whose work is being regulated. Given the trend towards deregulation (certainly 
in the USA and UK), there seems little prospect that regulatory authorities will have their funding 
increased in order to reduce this expertise asymmetry. In the UK fire deaths have fallen significantly 
in recent year, making it impossible to argue in the face of competing demands on resources that 
government should spend more on fire safety regulation. [11] 
 
Of course, it is likely that some fire disasters may still occur even with the very best regulation of 
prospective performance. The extent to which fire risks can be eliminated through the appropriate use 
of such knowledge may depend on the nature of the technology. Where technologies involve complex, 
tightly-coupled systems such as nuclear power stations, Perrow argues that ‘normal accidents’ are 
inevitable (though rare). [12] Perrow’s argument is that minor variations in technological performance 
and practice will occasionally align in a sequence of events leading to disaster because, as summarised 
by Downer, ‘trivial but irrepressible irregularities – the background static of normal technological 
practice - when taken together have inherent catastrophic potential.’ [13]  
 
It is an intriguing question (beyond the scope of this paper) as to how many fires can be seen as 
‘normal accidents’, and whether the move to PBD makes such systemic failure more likely. Advocates 
of PBD would argue that first principles fire safety engineering enables elegant solutions that can 
reduce complexity. However, in practice many applications of PBD appear to be ‘sticking plaster’ 
solutions applied to achieve regulatory compliance for a building design driven by other 
considerations – possibly the artistic vision of the architect, more likely the commercial desire for 
greater saleable or rentable floor space. This latter form of ‘remedial’ fire safety engineering often 
relies on the use of active systems such as smoke control or fire shutters, and thus adds complexity 
that may produce technological systems more prone to normal accidents. It is therefore conceivable 
that some fire risks are not amenable to regulatory control based on rational analysis of prospective 
performance. However, for the purposes of this paper it is assumed that for the majority of buildings 
the better regulators understand the performance of the technology, the better they can ensure its safety. 
 
In that case, the expertise asymmetry constitutes a crucial challenge for regulation because of the 
difficulty of assessing prospective performance. Whereas checking conformance with prescriptive 
regulations is in principle a straightforward ‘box-ticking’ exercise (although in practice prescriptive 
regulations are typically so complex that adjudication is often necessary to decide when a rule applies 
or even what a rule means), assessing the adequacy of prospective performance requires in-depth fire 
safety knowledge. But many regulators (e.g. in building control and in the fire services) will not have 
the same level of knowledge as that used by fire engineers in state-of-the-art implementations of PBD. 
 
PBD fire safety engineering can simply involve straightforward hand calculations to demonstrate an 
inherent safety feature of a building. A classic early example was the way that Margaret Law of Arup 
Fire used ‘an analytical and scientific rather than a conventional approach to fire safety’ to 
demonstrate the safety of the architect’s vision for the new Stansted airport building because the high 
ceiling design would act as a smoke reservoir, ‘allowing plenty of time for the building to be 
evacuated before the fumes reached floor level’. [14] However, many instances of PBD now draw on 
the latest research findings with fire safety solutions derived through the use of modeling of fire and 
smoke dynamics, structural responses, and human behaviour.  
 
Moreover, this increasing use of modeling tools (for example, the use of Computational Fluid 
Dynamics to demonstrate smoke control has become commonplace in some jurisdictions) in PBD can 
mean that some knowledge claims are in effect ‘black-boxed’, and thus opaque to many engineers as 
well as regulators. As Beard notes ‘the user must be knowledgeable about the limitations and 
conditions of applicability of the model’ because of ‘the possibility of misuse of the model and 
methodology, or misinterpretation of results.’ [15] Increasingly sophisticated graphical outputs for 
such modeling tools add to the risk that some regulators might be unaware of how little they 
understand. While regulators can, and often do, augment their own expertise through the use of outside 
review, decisions about approval ultimately rest with the regulator and depend on how well they 
understand the claims made about the efficacy of PBD solutions. 
 
EXPERTISE ASYMMETRY AND DELEGATED REGULATION 
<…> 
The issues raised by expertise asymmetry can be explored by brief analysis of regulation in two other 
industries: pharmaceuticals and aviation. In both these industries regulators seeks to understand 
performance before the technologies are approved for use in order to protect the public. In the case of 
new drugs, this assessment of prospective performance hinges on cost/benefit type judgments as to 
whether efficacy relative to existing treatments is sufficiently great to outweigh any side-effects. In 
aviation, the assessment is purported to assess whether a required level of reliability has been attained, 
with the US FAA having a goal of each safety-critical system having no more than one failure in every 
billion hours of flight. [16] 
 
Testing is central to both pharmaceutical and aviation regulation. In pharmaceuticals, satisfactory 
results in animal tests can lead to the approval of human trials and the results of these are interpreted 
to decide whether a new drug is both safe and effective. In the US, drug regulation is carried out by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and its experts assess the available data to decide whether a new 
drug should be approved, and at what doses. Similarly, US aviation regulation is carried out by the 
FAA (in conjunction with its European counterpart) and relies heavily on test data provided by 
manufacturers such as Boeing and Airbus. 
 
The problem facing these regulators is that they rely on industry to provide not just virtually all the 
data that they use for assessing performance, but also much of the analysis of that data. In the case of 
drug trials, data can be presented selectively, and trials that do not provide the desired results can 
simply be suppressed and not made available to the FDA (as of course is the case for furnace testing 
done by manufacturers to demonstrate fire resistance). Moreover, approval decisions often hinge on 
complex judgment calls about efficacy relative to existing treatments, potential side-effects, and the 
severity of the illness. Where these judgments are finely balanced, further expert advice may be sought, 
but these experts are rarely independent from the drug industry as their very expertise stems from their 
work in the same field, and they will most likely be in receipt of industry funding to do this research 
(and many may also have more direct connections with industry through consultancy work, as well as 
being share holders). 
 
In essence, therefore, although the FDA is in principle the regulator of new drugs approval in the USA, 
its reliance on data and expert advice from industry (or industry-influenced) sources means that in 
practice the industry plays a significant role in regulating itself. In UK drug regulation even some of 
the regulators themselves have ‘direct and indirect financial interests in pharmaceutical companies’, 
resulting in what Abraham and Davis call ‘permissive regulation’. [17] This form of ‘regulatory 
capture’ raises serious concerns about whether the right balance has been struck between commercial 
interests and public safety. 
 
Whereas the expertise asymmetry problem is unacknowledged in pharmaceutical regulation it has long 
been recognized as an issue for aviation, where it was realized that government regulators could not 
hope to stay sufficiently abreast of the wide variety of complex technologies involved. Instead, the 
FAA has sought to mitigate the expertise asymmetry by coopting senior engineers from the aviation 
industry to help with reliability assessments. The FAA’s approach recognizes that only those involved 
in the development of aviation technologies have sufficient knowledge to judge what is safe or not. 
Thus, the industry largely self-regulates because the FAA delegates much of the task to these 
Designated Engineering Representatives. [18] 
 
Aviation regulation is generally thought to work well in that air travel is relatively safe (certainly 
compared to other means of transport). Two aspects of the airliner innovation system explain why in 
this industry self-regulation works in maintaining public safety. First, the commercial interests of 
airliner manufacturers are strongly aligned with safety because of the reputational damage that can 
result from a major accident. The very visible nature of aircraft disasters in which the name of the 
manufacturer is likely to be reported, along with the high numbers of fatalities that often result from 
one accident, mean that any hint of wrong-doing could greatly impact on commercial performance. 
Second, airliner innovation is incremental in nature and thus past performance is generally a good 
guide to future performance (disasters such as those in the 1950s caused by metal fatigue in the Comet 
– the first jet airliner – have made the industry reluctant to introduce radical innovations). As Downer 
[19] notes: 
 
Reliability assessments of new civil aircraft lean very heavily on inferences from the – 
statistically well-established – data from earlier, different, aircraft designs. This is viable 
because the architects of new aircraft are highly conservative when developing new models. 
Large civil aircraft change only very incrementally between generations. Innovations are 
extremely modest, with new technologies being withheld until their reliability has been well-
established in other contexts (in military aircraft, for instance). 
 
DELEGATION TO PROFESSIONALS 
<…> 
When regulation requires close scrutiny of the prospective performance of complex technology, the 
expertise asymmetry means that some level of delegation is unavoidable. Those who develop the 
technology will best know how to judge its performance, but at the same time will also be susceptible 
to aligning their judgements with their organisational and commercial interests. In aviation this has not 
proved problematic because of the incremental nature of innovation in airliner technology and the 
great reputational damage that could be done to the commercial success of longstanding companies 
such as Boeing and Airbus.  
 Aviation regulators trust the industry to act responsibly and provide accurate and honest appraisals of 
technical performance. Downer [20] thus argues in the case of aviation that ‘high-technology 
regulators contend with an intractable technical problem by turning it into a more tractable social 
problem, such that, despite appearances to the contrary, the FAA quietly assess the people who build 
aeroplanes in lieu of assessing actual aeroplanes’. Other industries, where innovation does not follow 
such a gradual incremental path and where there are more companies with lower public profiles, may 
be more susceptible to a form of regulatory capture in which the ‘expertise asymmetry’ renders 
regulators unable to assure public safety. While there are large engineering companies that take great 
care to maintain their reputations, fire safety design is also carried out by many small operations for 
which the longevity of the business is likely to be much shorter than that of the buildings they design. 
Not only might such small operators be tempted by short-term economic gains, but also they may lack 
the full range of expertise to carry out competent PBD. 
 
However, an alternative model for self-regulation, in which people rather than technology are assessed, 
relies not on the alignment of the commercial interests of companies with the public good, but rather 
on the alignment of the behaviour of individual professionals working for those companies. The 
essence of a profession such as medicine or law is not just that the individual professionals are 
competent in a particular type of knowledge-based expertise, but also that they adhere to a particular 
code of conduct.  
 
Structural engineering provides a model for how fire engineering self-regulation could operate, clearly 
analogous to fire safety regulation because both aim to assure safety in the built environment. The 
work of structural engineers is typically not subject to detailed examination by regulators; rather 
structural engineers are trusted to be competent professionals. It is thus the people, and not their work 
that is regulated, and this regulation takes the form of effective self-regulation based around the 
accreditation of structural engineering as a profession Although the specifics vary between 
jurisdictions, this accreditation of structural engineering typically involves two components: education 
and experience. If a structural engineer has completed the requisite educational qualifications and 
accrued sufficient relevant experience then they are deemed competent by virtue of the resulting 
accreditation, and this means that they can practise their profession in that jurisdiction.  
 
Regulators may provide some oversight of the work of structural engineers, for example in England 
and Wales noting whether Approved Document A has been used. However, regulators will not 
normally seek to analyse or second-guess a structural engineer’s calculations. In some jurisdictions the 
reliance on engineers’ professionalism can be almost total. Thus, for example, the Building (Scotland) 
Act 2003 offers the option that ‘experienced, competent and responsible professionals can certify 
compliance with the Building Regulations without any further check by local authorities, provided that 
they are employed by reputable companies operating proper checking procedures.’ [21]  
 
Many would like to see fire safety engineers accorded the same status as competent, trust-worthy 
professionals. A significant step towards this came in 1996 when the Institution of Fire Engineers 
(IFE) was licensed by the Engineering Council to register members with the appropriate professional 
status according to their educational and experiential standing.  However, this accreditation operates as 
a weak guarantor of professional behaviour in the UK because it is not a necessary requirement to 
operate as a fire safety engineer. This is in contrast to jurisdictions such as the USA that have a strong 
form of accreditation whereby only registered/licensed engineers are able to sign off designs.  
 
In any case, even in the USA regulators scrutinise fire safety designs in detail. A number of factors 
may explain why regulation continues to be focussed on the quality of fire safety projects rather than 
on the quality of the engineers responsible for them. In particular, there are two ways in which fire 
safety engineering can be argued to differ from structural engineering. First, fire safety failures are 
highly probabilistic in nature, and sometimes many different factors need to interact to produce 
disastrous outcomes. Even when the causes of structural failure are probabilistic, for example due to 
earthquakes, the structural responses can largely be understood in terms of deterministic processes. 
The key aspect of fire safety engineering was summarised by Bullock and Monaghan [22]: 
 
It is also crucial to recognise that the thing that sets Fire Engineering apart from the majority 
of other engineering disciplines in the built environment is that fire is an accidental loading 
condition (ie there is a significant probabilistic aspect to its application), whereas other areas 
of design such as structural, acoustic and thermal performance are all ‘normal’ day-to-day 
service conditions.  
Failure to design and construct a building properly in terms of ‘normal’ service conditions 
tends to lead to a situation where resulting problems manifest themselves pretty quickly in 
terms of customer dissatisfaction. This is in marked contrast to defects in relation to fire 
safety that may not become apparent until there is a significant fire, (in itself, a probabilistic 
event). 
 
This difference may explain why there is less explicit learning from incidences where fire safety 
engineering is done badly. Unless a particular set of circumstance coincide many potential fire safety 
engineering failures may lie dormant throughout the whole lifetime of a building, and thus provide no 
feedback both as regards identifying the individuals responsible and informing the profession as a 
whole. Even when they do occur, major fires are rare and often poorly interrogated to gain useful 
engineering feedback. In contrast, structural engineering failures are usually highly visible, and 
learning from disasters is prioritised. For example, the Institution of Structural Engineers has an 
Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT) that is a funded group of structural 
engineers who go to major earthquake sites globally and study building performance. [23] There is no 
such ‘FEFIT’ group to investigate major fire engineering failures, and proposals to create one have so 
far have been ignored.  
 
The disparate and probabilistic nature of fire safety failures is also reflected in the heterogeneous 
nature of fire safety engineering as a profession. Not only is fire safety engineering very new as a 
profession compared to structural engineering, but it is also heterogeneous both as regards the 
disciplines involved (fire and smoke dynamics, structural response, and human behaviour) and the 
backgrounds of many involved. As Ben Bradford, chairman of the Fire Industry Association Fire Risk 
Assessment Councils Professional Standards Working Group, notes ‘the fire safety profession is in its 
infancy and the constituent base is very fragmented.’ [24] 
 
Apart from anything else, this fragmented constituency raises issues about accreditation through peer 
review. In principle, peer review should uphold a coherent set of standards as regards competency and 
ethics, but the issue for fire safety engineering is whether the profession as it is currently composed is 
sufficiently homogenous to have this coherence. Many of the new generation of fire safety engineers 
have high levels of education (often to PhD level) but little experience, whereas the ‘old guard’ may 
have less education, but decades of experience (albeit in a prescriptive regulatory environment). It may 
simply require some time before the balance between education and experience held by those who are 
considered professional fire safety engineers reaches a state that would be considered ideal for a 
profession. 
 
In addition, any lack of coherence in the expertise required to be a fire safety professional would raise 
concerns about the way that society arbitrates unsatisfactory professional performance through 
litigation. Again, comparison with structural engineering is instructive. The case of the Abbeystead 
Pumping Station, where a methane explosion caused 16 deaths and 22 injuries in 1984, provides a 
precedent for how professional performance is assessed under the law. Ultimately, the consulting 
engineers, Binnie and Partners, were found liable for negligence, but the judge, Lord Justice Bingham, 
summed up the argument for professional liability thus [25]: 
  
a professional man [sic] should command the corpus of knowledge which forms part of the 
professional equipment of the ordinary member of the profession. He should not lag behind 
other ordinarily assiduous and intelligent members of his profession in knowledge of new 
advances, discoveries or developments in his field. He should have such awareness as an 
ordinarily competent practitioner would have of the deficiencies in his knowledge and the 
limitations on his skill. He should be alert to the hazards and risks inherent in any 
professional task he undertakes to the extent that other ordinarily competent members of the 
profession would be alert. He must bring to any professional task he undertakes no less 
expertise, skill and care than other ordinarily competent members of his profession would 
bring, but need not bring more. 
 
Thus, if we apply this same standard to fire safety then it is clear that professional liability hinges on a 
coherent view as to what comprises an ‘ordinarily competent practitioner’. Fire safety engineering can 
therefore only be accorded the self-regulating privilege of a mature profession when it is clear that 
there is a level of knowledge and expertise (including awareness of the limitations of this expertise) 
that all accredited fire safety engineers would be expected to hold. 
<…> 
DISCUSSION 
<…> 
Traditional prescriptive regulation of fire safety is unlikely to disappear any time soon. For many types 
of buildings the prescriptive guidelines provide fire safety features that are straightforward to 
implement and approve. However, we do not know how these prescriptive approaches perform, except 
in so far as to note that fire deaths in the UK, for example, are lower than in living memory. 
Dissatisfaction with the prescriptive approach is thus not due to poor outcomes, but rather to its 
limiting effect on innovation, along with its imposition in some cases of what are thought to be overly 
restrictive, irrational, and costly requirements. As a result, the use of PBD is becoming increasingly 
common (in some places more than others), and this raises serious issues for regulatory oversight. 
 
A key challenge is that fire engineered PBD solutions rely on knowledge claims about a wide range of 
phenomena encompassing fire and smoke dynamics, structural responses and human behaviour, and 
there will almost inevitably be an ‘expertise asymmetry’ between the regulators and those they 
regulate. Regulators are now faced with seeking to adjudicate on fire safety knowledge claims made in 
PBD proposals, just as they have traditionally adjudicated on code compliance when working to 
prescriptive guidelines. However, whereas the regulators may have the upper hand when it comes to 
knowledge of the codes and their application, the opposite is likely to be true when it comes to 
knowledge of fundamental fire safety knowledge and its application. 
 
Given limited funding for regulation, the introduction of PBD as a fire safety engineering option thus 
means that regulators must increasingly rely on the fire safety profession to provide relevant data and 
analysis, leading to some degree of de facto self-regulation. An alternative to this approach would be 
to make self-regulation explicit by shifting regulatory oversight away from individual projects and on 
to individual professionals. If fire safety engineers were accorded the same status given to structural 
engineers as a self-regulating profession then the accreditation of individual fire safety engineers could 
be taken as a guarantee of their competence and ethical behaviour. However, there are two potential 
barriers to this. First, fire safety engineering is a relatively new discipline and its practitioners come 
from a wide range of backgrounds, with disparate levels of education and experience. It may simply 
take some time, along with active management of accreditation requirements, before fire safety 
engineering is sufficiently coherent as a discipline to be accorded full self-regulating professional 
status. Second, and perhaps more fundamental, the ability of fire safety engineers to ensure adequate 
safety depends on the reliability of their knowledge about fire risks and the techniques used to counter 
them, but fires are rare, typically involve many probabilistic factors, and are often poorly interrogated. 
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